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Interpretation, judgement, and dialogue: a hermeneutical recollection of 
causal analysis in critical terrorism studies 
 
This article problematises Critical Terrorism Studies’s (CTS) seeming reluctance to en-
gage in causal explanation. An analysis of the meta-theoretical assumptions on causation 
in both orthodox as well as critical terrorism studies reveals that the latter’s refusal to 
incorporate causal analysis in its broader research agenda reproduces - despite its com-
mitment to epistemological pluralism - the former’s understanding of causation as the 
only sustainable one. Elemental to this understanding is the idea that causation refers to 
the regular observation of constant conjunction. Due to the positivist leanings of such a 
conception, CTS is quick to dismiss it as consolidating Orthodox Terrorism Studies’s lack 
of critical self-reflexivity, responsibility of the researcher, and dedication towards inform-
ing state-led policies of counter-terrorism. Drawing on recent work in philosophy of 
science and International Relations, the article advances an alternative understanding of 
causation that emphasises its interpretative, normative, and dialogical fabric. It is there-
fore argued that CTS should reclaim causal analysis as an essential element of its research 
agenda. This not only facilitates a more robust challenge against orthodox terrorism stud-
ies’ conventional understanding of causation but also consolidates CTS’s endeavour of 
deepening and broadening our understanding that (re)embeds terrorist violence in its his-
torical and social context. 
 
Keywords: terrorism, causation, orthodox versus critical terrorism studies 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Examining causation in relation to the turn to political violence has always been a central, 
though often implicit, concern in the study of terrorism and political violence. Frequently, 
this boiled down to asking ‘what leads a person to turn to political violence?’ (Sageman 
2014, 565). Whereas many academic disciplines have sought to examine this question in 
differing ways, it can be seen as constituting the very raison d’être of terrorism studies, 
both in its orthodox and critical manifestation. Indeed, whether engagement with the 
  2 
causes of terrorism is driven by an agenda to provide more efficacy to policies of preven-
tion (Kydd and Walter 2006) or whether it concerns a more fundamental disposition for 
alleviating human suffering (Jackson 2012a), teasing out the causes of political violence 
or terrorism seems to be insurmountable for both the orthodox and critical strand of ter-
rorism studies. Although causation might at first not appear to be an essential concept in 
the study of terrorism and political violence, substantial reflection on causation is indis-
pensable since every theoretical engagement in this field, both orthodox and critical, is 
bound to make explicit or implicit assumptions on the causes or conditions of terrorism. 
Indeed, the very fact that one is to critically interrogate the notion of terrorism as an event 
and/or process is in itself entangled within causal assumptions.  
It goes without saying then, that orthodox and critical terrorism studies greatly 
differ in their conceptualisation of causation. Despite the fact that Critical Terrorism Stu-
dies (CTS) has successfully exposed the fundamental shortcomings of its orthodox sibling 
whilst offering a substantiated and effective alternative to it, the main argument of this 
article will be that CTS has been rather reluctant to explicitly engage causation when it 
comes to studying terrorism. The effect of this is that CTS risks being ignored by those 
interested in and committed to critically probing the causes of terrorism. The reasons for 
CTS’s reluctance to explicitly engage causation can arguably be attributed to the fact that 
the orthodox understanding of causation, which involves the notion of so-called “root” 
causes behind terrorism (Bjørgo 2005; Richardson 2006; Campana and Lapointe 2012), 
is taken to be subscribing to an agenda that involves the very reified conception of terro-
rism that CTS so fiercely opposes. This concerns the fact that orthodox research tends to 
decontextualise and dehistoricise the notion of terrorism in an attempt to inform state-led 
policies of counter-terrorism (Jackson 2012b). For CTS, the engagement with causation 
in Orthodox Terrorism Studies (OTS) is therefore taken to be grounded in the very cri-
tique it has raised against the orthodox study of terrorism (Jackson et al. 2009, 214-221).  
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The purpose of this article is to assess the costs of CTS’s seeming reluctance to 
examine causation more explicitly as this entails an unwanted reproduction of the deeply 
problematic understanding of the concept in OTS. This will involve the contention that 
the latter in fact propels the dehistoricised and decontextualised notion of terrorism that 
underpins OTS. Yet this is far from the only conception of causation out there. In philo-
sophy of science and the field of International Relations (IR) for instance, causation has 
undergone considerable critical scrutiny that seeks to move beyond the unhelpful stale-
mate between either the conventional understanding of causation (as it is produced in 
OTS) or a reluctance to engage it more critically (as in CTS) (Harré and Madden 1975; 
Bhaskar 1978; Kurki 2008; Suganami 2013). Drawing on this more nuanced and philo-
sophically grounded understanding of causation, the argument will tease out a concep-
tualisation of causation that further extends the insights that Critical Realism (CR) brings 
to the table while further developing the interpretative, normative, and dialogical fabric 
of causation (Herring and Stokes 2011; Porpora 2011). Accordingly, the argument will 
essentially contend that CTS can benefit a great deal from reclaiming causation as a more 
central and explicit element of both its argument and agenda. This involves a historicised 
and contextualised conception of the causes of terrorism that transforms CTS’s rejection 
of the problematic understanding of causation in OTS into an effective alternative that is 
instrumental to CTS’s fundamental commitment to a more critical understanding of ter-
rorism. 
The argument will proceed in three steps. Firstly, a brief overview will be pro-
vided of causation in OTS and the way causal explanation is conceptualised in reference 
to the philosophy of David Hume (1777). Secondly, a contrast will be drawn with CTS 
and flesh out the reasons why the latter has been reluctant to engage causation more ex-
plicitly. Most importantly, it will indicate how CTS, despite its profound commitment to 
epistemological and methodological pluralism, unknowingly reproduces the hegemony 
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of the conventional understanding of causation that was analysed in the first section. The 
final section will then bring in a number of insightful contributions to causation that pro-
liferated in IR over recent years. Drawing on a CR notion of causation that disavows the 
Humean conception without discarding the ontological quality of causal laws, the con-
tention will be made that the conventional understanding of causes of terrorism - produ-
ced in OTS and “reproduced” by CTS - requires an urgent overhaul by highlighting the 
interpretative, normative, and dialogical fabric of explaining causes. This also requires 
moving beyond CR’s conception of causation as it risks reproducing the subject/object 
distinction. More so, by emphasising the interpretive and normative character of causa-
tion, the elemental claim will be made that the causes of terrorism cannot be divorced 
from both the historicity and context within which (socially-constructed) acts of terrorism 
occur as well as the normative and ethical concerns that it invokes. This hermeneutical 
understanding of causation will then be presented as the substantial and necessary contri-
bution that CTS can make to the debate on the causes of terrorism. 
 
Causation in orthodox terrorism studies 
 
Similar to other event-driven disciplines, OTS emerged and developed as an attempt to 
causally explain events that were depicted as acts of terrorism or political violence. As it 
emerged out of the broader field of counter-insurgency studies (Stampnitzky 2013), one 
of the first volumes to systematically engage the causes of political violence was Ted 
Gurr’s Why Men Rebel (1970) in which the issue of causal explanation was approached 
as follows: ‘What are the psychological and social sources of the potential for collective 
violence? […] And what societal conditions affect the magnitude and form, and hence 
the consequences, of violence?’ (1970, 7-8). Although Gurr does not refer to the notion 
of terrorism explicitly or even accounts for the political nature of the violence he seeks to 
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explain, it is nonetheless important to understand how he immediately situated one of the 
main causal conditions in the psychological realm. As such, his argument reflects a strong 
emphasis on the psychological processes that individuals and collectives undergo as they 
resort to political violence. This explanation is, following Charles Tilly, not a very novel 
argument as it concerns the simple idea that when people psychologically perceive a gap 
between what they have and what they deserve, they will resort to violence when the 
opportunity presents itself (1971, 417). This emphasis on psychological factors was soon 
challenged when scholars started to relate political violence to what were described as 
acts of terrorism. In order to replace Gurr’s focus on violence amidst rebellions with an 
emphasis on the resort to violence itself, David Rapoport for instance argued that terro-
rism should be understood as an entirely new concept (1971). Subsequently, adopting the 
nomenclature of terrorism pushed the causal explanation into a more strategy-driven un-
derstanding of the concept; something that was further elaborated by Martha Crenshaw 
who codified some of the key elements in terrorism research. Although she still ack-
nowledged terrorism’s roots in civil wars and revolutionary insurgencies, Crenshaw un-
derstood that the causes of terrorism have to be found in its strategic efficacy as the ‘wea-
pon of the weak’ (1981:387). 
Accordingly, both these elements (psychological and strategic) were combined in 
the assumption that the causes for terrorism were to be found in an attempt to install fear 
in order to produce a political effect (Reich 1990).i This remained the dominant unders-
tanding of terrorism’s causes until the period around the turn of the millennium introdu-
ced a supposedly new form of terrorism that was seemingly driven by religious motiva-
tions. Tellingly, this new form of terrorism was quickly defined as the “new terrorism” 
and was held to be distinguished from previous acts of terrorism or political violence by 
its small number of members, higher degree of radicalisation, lack of a rational agenda 
(which gave rise to the assumption of fanaticism), and deeper infiltration into society 
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(Laqueur 1999). Even though the term itself would be widely debated in the field (Kur-
tulus 2011; Lynch and Ryder 2012), the succession of so-called terrorist attacks in Wes-
tern cities in the twenty-first century were depicted as supporting some of the key as-
sumptions of “new terrorism” that make it still a noteworthy concept in OTS today (Jäckle 
and Baumann 2015). 
Before we unearth the causal mechanisms that underpin these various causal expla-
nations, it is worth emphasising the catalysing effect that the aforementioned attacks had 
on the field of OTS. A number of key works that were published in the first decade of the 
new century would namely consolidate the popular idea that ‘9/11 changed everything’ 
(Dunmire 2009). Although it is commonly agreed that these attacks also induced a pro-
fessionalisation of the field (Jackson 2012b), the canonical texts of OTS that appeared 
around this time subordinated causal explanation to an agenda that was ultimately geared 
towards policy information, implementation, and improvement (Sageman 2004; Hoffman 
2006). No work reflects this catering towards the so-called War on Terror more unambi-
guously than Robert Pape’s Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism 
(2005), which boldly states that ‘Our enemies have been studying suicide terrorism for 
over twenty years. Now is the time to level the playing field’ (Pape 2005, 12). It is this 
automatic deployment of causal explanation in the service of state-led policies of counter-
terrorism that constitutes a central point of critique for CTS. 
The question then is how this taxonomy of causal explanations (psychological, stra-
tegic, religious) can be translated into effective causal mechanisms. In other words, how 
does OTS conceptualises causation? A more elaborate and direct engagement with the 
causes behind terrorism is given by Louise Richardson (2006), who argues that causes 
are to be located at the level of the individual (which are willing to join an organisation), 
the level of the organisation itself (which is willing to resort to violence), and the level of 
the sponsoring state (which is willing to sponsor organisations that enhance their strategic 
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and political interests). Additionally, Richardson also refers to societal factors such as 
degrees of poverty, inequality, and the idea of relative deprivation, yet she designates 
these as risk factors that may improve the likelihood of terrorism but are not explicit 
causes (2006, 57). Most importantly however, Richardson highlights that these causes 
work together, claiming that both individual and organisational motivations as well as 
external sponsorship are required to induce the occurrence of terrorist violence. 
A similar concession to multi-causal explanation is provided in Tore Bjørgo’s vo-
lume Root Causes of Terrorism (2005), which differentiates the following types of causes 
(3-4): structural (macro-level indicators such as demographic imbalances, globalisation, 
rapid modernisation), facilitating (causal instruments such as evolution of modern and 
social media, advanced weapons technology), motivational (people’s experiences of grie-
vances and trigger motivations to act), and triggering (direct triggers such as political 
calamity or an outrageous act committed by a political adversary). Regarding the causal 
mechanisms that orchestrate the workings of these causes, Bjørgo admits that it is unclear 
to what extent the concept of “root” cause itself is actually effective terminology as this 
suggests a process of generalising particularities beyond an immediate efficacy for 
research. 
The main point to draw from this brief overview is that OTS has never produced a 
substantial and detailed account of how it understands causation in relation to terrorism.ii  
This is problematic since it nonetheless makes a number of implicit yet strong assump-
tions about the causes of terrorism that are incessantly reproduced throughout its theo-
rising. Indeed, due to OTS’s fundamental disposition towards counter-terrorist policy in-
formation, discriminatory attention is paid to particular factors (i.e. so-called “root” 
causes such as individuals, groups, and states) while subjugating other factors that are 
“merely” facilitating (i.e. societal or communal conditions, the historical context, the ef-
fects of counter-terrorist policies, etc.). This hierarchy then creates an epistemological 
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crisis whereby critical elements are systematically ignored by the epistemic community 
of OTS in favour of those factors that support prevailing counter-terrorist policies (Jack-
son 2015). An important criterium that determines how a causal relationship can effecti-
vely be established is then the extent to which they can be measured and/or observed. It 
is for these reasons that OTS’s account of causation comfortably falls under a conception 
of causal analysis that is informed by the philosophy of David Hume. Describing cause 
as ‘an object, followed by another, and where all the object similar to the first are fol-
lowed by objects similar to the second’ (1962, 76), Hume’s understanding of causation 
largely ascribes to the idea that causal relations can be established by regular occurrence 
of a correlation between, what is simultaneously established as, cause and effect. Refer-
ring to this understanding as “Humeanism”, causes are understood as the efficient agent 
of change, i.e. that which “pulls or pushes” something. This is for instance why Richard-
son does not consider issues like poverty, inequality, or deprivation as causal factors since 
they cannot be established as actively “pushing or pulling” terrorism in a regular and 
observable way. What is interesting then is that, since the aforementioned issues are 
indeed equally measurable and observable, OTS tends to apply the Humean conception 
of causation arbitrarily. As such, it actively subjugates factors that are not observed as 
directly “pushing and pulling” acts of terrorism; which indeed further exacerbates its epis-
temological crisis. 
In summary, OTS makes an implicit yet fundamental assumption about causation 
that is steeped in empiricism as it solely focusses on causes that can be observed regularly 
through sensory experience. Whether this can be attributed to broader positivist or beha-
viourist assumptions is not at stake here (Kurki 2008, 97-105). The important issue is to 
understand that even though there is no explicit engagement with causation as such, OTS 
directly mirrors other disciplines in, what can be referred to as, the rationalist mainstream 
of social sciences, which articulates causes as levers that regularly produce a particular 
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outcome in a given context and can be observed consistently (King et al. 1994, 75). Im-
portant in this regard is that this conception has a discriminatory dynamic, which subju-
gates historical and contextual factors that are not taken to be actively “pushing and pul-
ling” acts of terrorism and entrenches its epistemic community into an epistemological 
crisis. I will return to the consequences of these assumptions in the last section yet before 
this is done, an important contrast needs to be drawn with the way CTS understands cau-
sation. 
 
Causation in critical terrorism studies 
 
Ten years ago, a subfield emerged in terrorism studies that sought to achieve two things: 
highlight the pitfalls and shortcomings of orthodox research on terrorism on the one hand 
and provide a full-fledged alternative that could successfully move beyond these on the 
other. In the form of a new academic journal and an edited volume (Jackson et al. 2009), 
CTS is a broad academic endeavour that presents an alternative study of terrorism and 
critically probes some of the fundamental assumptions that guide OTS. The quintessential 
question for the present inquiry then is; to what extent did CTS present an alternative 
account of causation in relation to studying terrorism? In line with CTS’s twofold agenda, 
this would imply conceptualising the dissatisfaction with the conventional understanding 
of causation in OTS on the one hand and providing an alternative account that moves 
beyond these shortcomings on the other. Yet before this question can be addressed di-
rectly, a little more needs to be said about CTS’s history and its elemental lines of inquiry. 
Broadly speaking, CTS’s general dissatisfaction with OTS stems from four per-
sistent issues (Jackson et al. 2009, 217-221): an incoherent and depoliticised definition of 
the term terrorism itself that reflects an intrinsic state-bias and thereby excludes state-led 
terrorism; an artificial separation of terrorist attacks and the broader social, political, and 
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economic context within which they occur; the absence of an ethical disposition that dog-
matically adheres to state-led practices of counter-terrorism and fails to account for the 
responsibility the researcher has in this context; and, most importantly, a fundamental 
lack of a critical reflective attitude that fails to account for the discursive nature within 
which acts or events are depicted as corresponding to the label “terrorism”. As it was 
mentioned in the previous section, this critique amounts to the fact that OTS subjugates 
particular knowledges, which entrenches its epistemological crisis and makes its concep-
tion of causation deeply problematic. 
The theoretical pillars upon which CTS’s critique is predicated can be defined 
as a ‘Frankfurt School-inspired critical theory approach’ (Toros and Gunning 2009, 87). 
Although the notion of Critical Theory as such has not received a codified definition, the 
general assumption is that CTS - much like the other Critical Theory-inspired sub-field 
of Critical Security Studies (Wyn Jones 1999) - took its conceptual inspiration from two 
well-known understandings of Critical Theory: on the one hand there is Max Horkhei-
mer’s seminal dichotomy between traditional and critical theory (1982) and on the other 
hand there is Robert Cox’s differentiation between problem-solving and critical theory in 
IR (1981). Whereas the way CTS receives and deploys this conceptual heritage has been 
put under critical scrutiny elsewhere (Heath-Kelly 2010), the central assumption involves 
that Critical Theory stands apart from conventional modes of theorising that are impeded 
by a lack of critical self-reflectivity. In Horkheimer’s case, this involves a conception of 
traditional theory as incorporating an untenable subject-object divide (and the correspon-
ding fact-value distinction) that does not account for the way it continuously reproduces 
the existing order or status quo. With Cox, there is a similar treatment of the relationship 
between reality and the researcher as he conceptualises problem-solving theory as a form 
of theorising that obfuscates its performative character since theory is ‘always for some-
one, and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981, 128). In short, Critical Theory operates out of a 
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fundamental concern with the political (and subsequently ethical) dynamics through 
which theory is produced and operates. This involves a process of continuously decon-
structing the artificial separation of object/subject, reality/researcher, fact/value, etc. 
It should be immediately clear that the broader framework of Critical Theory 
proved to be exceptionally useful for an endeavour that sought to criticise the way OTS 
has treated its subject matter. Advocating the importance of a critical reflective disposi-
tion, Toros and Gunning for instance argue that, in CTS, critical means ‘to stand apart 
from the prevailing order of the world and asking how that order came to be’ (1986, 208). 
This practice of questioning how a prevailing order came to be essentially points towards 
the shallowness of the orthodox conception of terrorism (see above). CTS therefore em-
phasises the importance of both deepening and broadening this conception (Toros and 
Gunning 2009, 89-99). Regarding the former, this involves a process of unearthing the 
wider power structures within which the orthodox conception of terrorism has emerged. 
Regarding the later, this involves the inclusion of state responses to violence and other 
forms of structural violence into a more holistic approach to the notion of terrorism. As 
such, CTS seeks to de-exceptionalise events depicted as terrorism - which constitute OTS 
as an event-driven discipline - by embedding them in a broader context of political protest 
and other forms of contentious politics. As such, CTS is a project of (re)contextualising 
and (re)historicising the notion of terrorism. 
It appears then that CTS’s agenda of deepening and broadening the orthodox 
conception of terrorism has a direct relevance to the concept of causation. If terrorism is 
namely to be regarded as a discursive label that is produced through a particular nexus of 
power relations (e.g. conventional assumption that only non-state actors can engage in 
terrorist attacks, or that negotiations necessarily encourage terrorism, or that counter-ter-
rorist policies necessarily increase citizen’s security), the question arises to what extent 
terrorism as a notion corresponds to a reality “out there”. In other words, the emphasis on 
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the discursive and social construction of terrorism risks of obfuscating the so-called ma-
terial reality “out there” (i.e. the event that is discursively depicted as an act of terrorism) 
into an entangled web of social interactions that tend to obscure the objective existence 
of that reality. This would then make it virtually impossible to even consider the existence 
of conditions for causation (i.e. something causing something else). The broader debate 
within which this can be categorised is a long-running one in the social sciences that 
concerns the relationship between discourse and reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In 
IR, this debate has lead to different positions on our assumptions about reality: from a 
rationalist affirmation of an objective reality (Keohane 1988), to the fundamental ques-
tioning of this seeming objectivity (Ashley 1989), and a middle ground that assumes the 
existence of a reality that is prone to different interpretations (Kratochwil 1989). Circum-
venting this unhelpful debate, Toros and Gunning are quick to indicate that the category 
of violence needs to be retained as a minimal foundation upon which the discourse of 
terrorism operates (2009, 92). Accordingly, it is the extent to which this category can be 
defined as “terrorism” that CTS seeks to problematise. So it is not a matter of denying the 
existence of political violence as such but of interrogating how and why this violence is 
or can be framed as terrorism. This also prevents CTS from becoming a rigidly codified 
enterprise since it is predicated on a pluralist ‘commitment to encouraging epistemologi-
cal and methodological diversity’ (Jackson 2012, 6). As such, it is geared towards inter-
rogating the notion of terrorism from a multiplicity of critical angles. The fundamental 
question then is, what role does causation play in this interrogation? 
It goes without saying that CTS strongly objects to the understanding of causa-
tion that is enhanced in OTS. This is for instance evident in questioning whether focussing 
on causation itself actually ‘has a causal impact on reducing terrorism’ (Raphael 2009, 
61). The general idea seems to be that terrorism itself ‘is not a causally coherent, free-
standing phenomenon which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the 
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violence itself’ (Jackson 2009, 75). CTS therefore takes aim with the so-called epistemic 
community of OTS as one of ‘specialists with a common world view about cause and 
effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values 
about the type of policies to which they should be applied’ (Stone 1996, 86). What is 
interesting about this objection is that it is directed towards so-called ‘mono-causal ex-
planations of terrorism’ (Jackson 2009, 7). As such, critiques have been raised against 
such mono-causal explanations that involve poverty (Huesmann and Huesmann 2012), 
religion (Goodwin 2012), or democracy (Al-Sumait, Lingle, and Dome 2009).  
However, CTS’s aversion towards the so-called “covering law” conception of 
“root” causes of terrorism does not imply that theorists have not engaged with the broader, 
contextual conditions that facilitate it. In fact, it is precisely the tendency towards decon-
textualisation in OTS that has urged CTS to bring the socio-cultural context within which 
terrorism emerges back in. Discussing the social construction of organised political vio-
lence, Jackson and Dexter have for instance indicated that there are enabling structures 
and conditions that facilitate political violence or terrorism (Jackson and Dexter 2014, 2-
3). In arguing that that these structures always operate in interplay with agents and pro-
cesses, they almost echo OTS’s earlier mentioned conception of causation that, despite 
its ultimate subjugation of structural conditions in favour of agential causes, nonetheless 
sees conditions and causes operating together. Yet for Jackson and Dexter, this interplay 
is less hierarchical, with both structure and agency considered to be interdependent and 
co-constitutive: ‘structures are the product of social actions; social actions are shaped and 
made possible by structures’ (4). Yet this emphasis on contextual conditions does not 
make CTS resort to causal discourse. Toros and Gunning for instance do ‘not reject the 
notion of “regularities” (what positivists would call laws)’ (2009, 92). Jackson goes even 
further, arguing that CTS explicitly refuses to abide by the conceptualisation of causation 
in OTS: 
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Importantly, CTS refuses to privilege materialist, rationalist, and positivist approaches to 
social science over interpretive and reflectivist approaches, and seeks to avoid an exclu-
sionary commitment to the narrow logic of traditional social scientific explanation based 
on linear notions of cause and effect (Jackson et al. 2009, 225-226). 
 
CTS thereby takes aim at OTS’s positivist conception of causation that is taken to have 
discursively produced the decontextualised and dehistoricised conception of terrorism. 
By (re)contextualising and (re)historicising terrorism back into broader socio-contextual 
processes - such as for instance democratisation, modernisation, globalisation, and the 
widening North-South divide - CTS seeks to challenge the idea that there is such a thing 
as a solid or “root” cause of terrorism. 
Even though omitting causation could be potentially defended as a logical ele-
ment in CTS’s research agenda, the implications of this omission are nonetheless detri-
mental. By refusing to conceptualise the interplay between agents and structure in causal 
terms on the one hand, and valorising socio-contextual processes and discursive me-
chanisms over individual and organisational agency on the other, CTS not only allows 
OTS to monopolise its conception of the causes of terrorism as the only game in town but 
it also risks of undermining its own critique of the latter’s subjugation of knowledge. This 
is unfortunate as the interplay between different levels of analysis is arguably an element 
where CTS anticipates or implicates a conception of causation that allows for a more 
multi-faceted and sophisticated interrogation of the causes of terrorism. It seems then that 
CTS’s emphasis on epistemological plurality also comes at a cost:  
 
Critical approaches to terrorism do not have a unified stance on the causes of terrorism. While 
some critical scholars are sceptical of the entire notion of causation, regarding it as too embedded 
in positivist, problem-solving perspectives, others accept it but are wary of mono-causal expla-
nations (Jackson et al. 2011, 199). 
  15 
 
Even though this critique of mono-causal explanations could be developed as an 
effective platform to conceptualise causation more critically, an inherent tendency to 
depict causal analysis as the very dynamic that has produced a decontextualised and de-
historicised conception of terrorism effectively inhibits such an alternative. Accordingly, 
this has garnered some criticism in recent years where CTS’s constructivist/discursive 
ontology is seen as undermining its overall efficacy as a theory. Following Jonathan Jo-
seph, the most substantial problem with CTS is namely that the social and discursive 
practices, which are emphasised as determining the orthodox conception of terrorism, 
only have meaning through the material interests and socio-economic relations it tends to 
ignore (Joseph 2011, 33). In other words, even though Toros and Gunning were right to 
retain a minimal foundationalism when it comes to the material reality of political vio-
lence, CTS conceptualisation of terrorism as a social fact tends to obscure this material 
residue. Joseph therefore criticises CTS for being too quick in discarding material reality 
“out there” by interpreting it in rather crude and physicalist terms. As such, he regards as 
unhelpful the binary between social intersubjectivity (terrorism is a label given to a par-
ticular event through discursive practices and contextual conditions) and brute materiality 
(terrorism refers to specific acts of terrorism such as the attacks on 11 September 2001). 
A way out of this stalemate would be to highlight that, even though terrorism might 
indeed not constitute a solid and positivist objectivity, there is still something “out there” 
upon which these discursive practices are constructed without necessitating the assump-
tions of solid positivism. Joseph considers CTS to be moving too far in the constructivist 
direction as he argues that terrorism ‘is a social relation that is overdetermined by both 
material and discursive practices’ (2011, 34).  
A number of arguments have therefore contended that what CTS requires is ‘a 
philosophy of science that stands in between positivism and postmodernism’ (Porpora 
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2011, 40).iii As such, it concerns a meta-theoretical orientation that strongly opposes the 
ultimately flawed positivist conception of causation without relapsing into a radically 
discursive argument that indirectly accepts or at least reproduces this conception. And 
this orientation has been presented as a Critical Realist (CR) one (Herring and Stokes 
2011). As a so-called “underlabouring meta-theory” ‘that informs the construction of 
specific theories in the course of empirical research’ (Cruickshank 2002, 50), CR assumes 
the existence of structures and causal mechanisms as “real” ontological entities which 
cannot be directly accessed or known in epistemological terms (Archer et al. 1998, 5). It 
therefore concerns, in the words of Roy Bhaskar, ‘a non-anthropocentric ontology of 
structures, generative mechanisms, and active things’ (2008, 35). Although the scope of 
the present analysis does not permit a more substantial engagement with CR, what should 
be taken from Bhaskar’s position is a recognition that causation is ontologically real but 
that we are limited in our capacity to access these causal mechanisms. Not only has this 
sparked immense interest and debate in philosophy of science (Collier 1994) and Inter-
national Relations (Kurki 2008; Joseph and Wright 2010), CR has also found its way into 
CTS as a potential candidate for reclaiming causal analysis. This concerns an endeavour 
that understands causal analysis as ‘identifying and describing the mechanisms through 
which things work’ (Porpora 2011, 42). As such, there is no inherent justification for an 
‘aversion to causal language’ (Kurki 2008, 130) if the latter can be reconceptualised along 
anti-positivist lines. Applied to the present analysis, the question then is whether CR’s 
conception of causation can provide an alternative understanding of the causes of terro-
rism that recollects CTS’s multiplicity of interplaying conditions on the one hand yet 
consolidates this into an explicitly causal analysis that constitutes a substantial alternative 
to OTS on the other. This will be explored in the next and final section, which will indi-
cate that it is specifically a hermeneutical conceptualisation of causation that can intro-
duce the potential of causal analysis to CTS. 
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A hermeneutical recollection of causation 
 
In an attempt to move beyond the singular and problematic conception of causation that 
is (re)produced in both positivist and post-positivist philosophies of science, theories of 
IR, and terrorism studies, CR theorists have argued that this Humean theory is far from 
the only way of understanding causation. Kurki for instance understands this “pulling and 
pushing” depiction of causes as merely one of the four Aristotelian causes. These include 
material causes (the matter of an object), formal causes (the form of an object), efficient 
causes (the primary source of change, i.e. the agential mover), and final causes (that “for 
the sake of which” something comes to be, i.e. the intention) (Kurki 2008, 25-30). Effi-
cient causes are then the conception of causation that are reproduced by both positivists 
and post-positivists. What is striking about Kurki’s conceptualisation is that, in typical 
CR fashion, she deploys Aristotle’s causal taxonomy in a way that advances an unders-
tanding of them as ‘ontologically grounded’ (2008, 26). Material causes are for instance 
ontologically prior to all other causes since nothing in the world (natural and social) can 
exist without materiality, according to Aristotle. As such, Kurki emphasises the insur-
mountable role material causes play in order to clarify why post-positivists are wrong to 
dismiss the role of materiality: material causes remind us that there is a material world 
“out there” that enables and constrains our actions. So it is possible to retain a minimal 
foundation in causal analysis. 
Yet there is more. As the same ontological quality applies to formal and final 
causes, the entire ontological status of causation is reclaimed as something that exists in 
the world “out there”. This is exactly what Bhaskar had argued above: causation has an 
ontological quality as opposed to be merely a construction of the mind. The latter can be 
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understood as the essential assumption on causation that underpins Hume’s theory. As 
mentioned in the first section, the latter understands causation to be the effect of observing 
regular conjunction. Yet this conception does not ascribe an ontological status to causa-
tion as such since it does not account for causal necessity. It merely provides a psycholo-
gical explanation of causation as something we perceive through impressions. This, 
however, presented a fundamental problem for Hume himself since he believed that ‘all 
our ideas […] are copies of our impressions’ (1962, 19). Yet if this is the case, then how 
can we have an idea of causal necessity if there is no perceptual impression that can ac-
count for it. This obviously implies that Hume himself would not agree with the determi-
nistic interpretation that his work has been subjected to in the positivist, “pushing and 
pulling” conception of causation that has been discussed throughout this article. A way 
out of the dichotomy between causation as objective “pushing and pulling” levers or me-
rely an idea in the mind therefore involves the deepening of the concept of causation (with 
broadening being the inclusion of the other Aristotelian causes). Providing causation with 
a deep ontology thereby consists of grasping ‘the nature of objects through making exis-
tential claims about their constituting structures and causal powers, thereby enabling ex-
planations of various ‘actual’ or empirical processes and tendencies’ (Kurki 2008, 198). 
However, before one assumes that this conception of causation can be automatically 
applied to questions on the causes of terrorism, it is worth pointing to Kurki’s contention 
at the end of her analysis that ‘the question of causation is not a problem that can be 
solved: it is merely a problem that can be solved in various different ways’ (2008, 307). 
Not only does this pluralism directly resonates within CTS’s commitment to epistemolo-
gical and methodological diversity, it also reflects an understanding of causal analysis as 
identifying and describing how things work. Interestingly, Porpora has alternatively re-
ferred to this as a ‘historical narrative’ (2011, 42) that binds together agent and structure 
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in a historical context and process. He argues that this involves the development of inter-
pretations that can be assessed in their correspondence to the way the world is. This then 
strikes a subtle balance between discursive interpretation (causation relates to our histo-
rical narration of events) and objective reality (the world “out there” operates as a crite-
rion for falsifying these interpretations). The only problem with it, however, is that it 
covertly reintroduces the subject/object distinction that CTS and other critical theories so 
fiercely criticised for facilitating the decontextualised and dehistoricised understanding 
of causation in positivist philosophy of science. Although much can be said about the way 
CR has been applied to IR and CTS (Brown 2007; Chernoff 2007), it seems that rather 
than finding a third way between positivism and postmodernism - whose arguments are 
more nuanced and prone to internal debate than CR theorists imply (Jackson 2011) - this 
unhelpful binary needs to be dismantled entirely. Indeed, it is the interpretive conception 
of causation that moves beyond the subject/object distinction by developing the notion of 
historical narrative as a perspectivism that does not deny the existence of a reality “out 
there” but merely suggests that there are different interpretations of it. This retains the 
insightful contributions of CR while nonetheless bridging the subject/object divide by 
depicting causation as effectively the interpretation of events. Not only does this facilitate 
CTS’s pluralist epistemology, it also allows for a profoundly causal analysis of terrorism 
that further strengthens CTS’s core commitments. This will be developed in the remain-
der of this section. 
 
Causation as interpretation 
Understanding causation as interpretation effectively moves beyond the dichotomy bet-
ween the aforementioned positions of Hume and Bhaskar (an their relative school’s of 
thought). Following Hidemi Suganami, it can be argued that both thinkers saw ‘the world 
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as an open system, where, by definition, antecedents of causal laws are not followed pre-
valently by their consequents’ (2016, 13). What this means is that the world is by no 
means a closed system where causal powers can be known in isolation but an open system 
where these powers are entangled in a rhizomatic complexity. Yet this complexity does 
not imply the mere relativity of causation. Richard Feynman has for instance stated that 
‘the most important things in the real world appear to be a kind of complicated accidental 
result of a lot of laws’ (1992, 122). Indeed, the open-systemic quality of the world implies 
that it hosts a great number of laws that can be shown but never known in isolation. 
Causal analysis then becomes a practice of fleshing out a causal pattern in the midst 
of an open system that is not as much directed towards predicting the future as it is about 
explaining the past. In doing so, causation becomes a matter of interpretive historio-
graphy: ‘IR theorists, when attempting to explain the occurrence of a particular event, 
should do what historians commonly try to do’ (Suganami 2016, 15). Causation is then 
the establishing of a historical narrative that seeks to explain a particular event by pointing 
towards a particular causal dynamic or mechanism. Embracing the open-systemic nature 
of the social world provides causal analysis with a hermeneutic quality whereby a causal 
pattern is a matter establishing the most effective and probable interpretation of a parti-
cular event. What is at stake here then is to account for the complexity and diversity of 
the social world without relapsing into an anything goes story where any causal pattern 
can be established. 
As such, causal interpretation is grounded in historical explanation that is not fabri-
cated out of thin air. To understand this, it is important to comprehend that asking a ques-
tion on the cause of something is nothing but the presentation of a narrative that seeks to 
explain that particular event (Suganami 1996, 150). When we ask “what caused this par-
ticular act of political violence?” we do not ask what causes political violence in general 
but what causes this particular act; i.e. we try to make sense of this event by historically 
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explaining how it came to be. The reason why history is so important for causal analysis, 
Suganami argues, is that it does not conflate theorising with generalising (2013, 640). 
When we understand what caused a particular historical event like a an act of political 
violence, it does not imply that this causal explanation will capacitate us to explain all 
instances of political violence accordingly.  
It is within this conceptualisation of causation as historical interpretation that an 
effective critique against causation as observed regularity can be found, as it undermines 
the assumptions OTS has made about causation. As we saw in the first section, the OTS’s 
attempt to valorise particular “root” causes over “mere” conditions (i.e. what in Aristote-
lian terms implies valorising efficient and final causes over material and formal causes) 
is not grounded in an endeavour to explain a particular event but to generalise its causes 
in order to predict other events in the future. Not only does this lead to an epistemological 
crisis where a particular event is not even adequately explained, it also further deprives 
the causes of terrorism of their historical context. As Bjørgo himself noted, the assump-
tion of generalising particularity in causal analysis has a tendency of undermining its own 
efficacy. Explaining a particular event in terrorism studies will therefore need to cease 
looking for patterns of regularity and start engaging in the historical interpretation of this 
event. This stems from the fact that there is no singular cause but a plethora of potential 
causes that need to be subjected to critical interpretation: ‘causal powers are everywhere 
- exercised but not always realised’ (Suganami 2013, 641). There is in itself nothing 
wrong with the emphasis on the multi-causal nature of terrorism yet this does not neces-
sitate that all causes are always realised in every case. It is therefore a matter of discrimi-
nating among these causes depending on the particular case-at-hand; which is different 
from OTS’s hierarchical discrimination between “root” causes and conditions. This 
chimes in well with CTS’s agenda of deepening and broadening our understanding of 
terrorism as it exhausts the limited causal explanation of OTS. More so, embedding causal 
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explanation in this broader web of historical and contextual analysis addresses CTS’s 
concern that OTS is impeded by an ‘absence of social theory in terrorism studies, rigid 
disciplinary boundaries and the lack of theoretical cross-fertilisation, and the tendency to 
exceptionalise terrorist violence in relation to other forms of violence and political action’ 
(Jackson et al. 2009, 219). Understanding terrorism as entangled in this broader social 
web that interconnects agents, structures, and processes therefore requires causal inter-
pretation of how this web produced the events that are analysed. In addition, it also firmly 
embeds the researcher within as opposed to outside the social world: causal interpretation 
not only involves a discursive practice in which a particular interpretation is critically 
presented and assessed, it also directly reflects an orientation of self-reflectivity and auto-
ethnography on behalf of the researcher (Jackson 2012, 3). 
 
Causation as moral judgement 
It appears then that CTS’s reluctance to engage in causal analysis has overlooked an in-
terpretative conceptualisation of causation that chimes in well with its critical thematic. 
Indeed, for Suganami, ‘causal explanations have to do with the workings of the world as 
understood by us’ (2011, 720). This implies that questions of causation bear an intrinsic 
vernacular quality that seeks to understand the world from a particular perspective. 
Further debunking the positivist myth of the fact/value distinction, this entails that the 
particular questions we ask in causal inquiry are by no means neutral statements about an 
objective world but stem from a phenomenological disposition that seeks to make sense 
of the world around us. As Suganami writes, ‘it is not possible to have direct access to 
the world to ascertain what ‘really’ goes on there and decide whether or not a given scien-
tific representation of it is ‘true’ in the sense of ‘corresponding to it’ (2011, 732). What 
is meant here is that, when we seek to understand what caused a particular event, we 
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literally attempt to make sense of it. Indeed, interpretation is always tied to a perspective 
from which the interpreting is done. 
Yet what Suganami adds to this is that, in our very questioning of a particular act, 
we make ‘a judgement on the moral quality of the particular act’ (2011, 728). He clarifies 
this by arguing that when we ask a question about the causes of an event, we often ask a 
fundamental question concerning moral responsibility. If we, for instance, ask what 
caused a particular act of political violence, we are fundamentally interested in isolating 
the moral responsibility related to the occurrence of this particular act of political vio-
lence. In social sciences the empirical and the moral are often divorced yet the notion of 
causation clearly exposes the untenability of this separation: ‘the values to which we 
subscribe and the kinds of knowledge claim we produce about the world are interrelated’ 
(Suganami 2011, 732).  
Causation as moral judgement then directly resonates within CTS’s core commit-
ment dismantling the fact/value distinction but also to self-reflexivity and ethics (Breen 
Smyth 2009). Yet it also puts extra emphasis on CTS’s refusal ‘to define terrorism either 
in ways that de-legitimise some actors while simultaneously according the mantle of le-
gitimate violence to others’ (Jackson 2007, 247). More so, it can take a more forceful 
stance against accusation that CTS’s emphasis on discourse effectively legitimates vio-
lence (Jones and Smith 2010). By adopting a normative conception of causation, CTS is 
also better positioned to expose the seemingly neutral questions on causation that consti-
tute OTS as obfuscating both the moral values and judgements that inherently underpin 
them on the one hand as well as the unreflective catering towards counter-terrorist poli-
cies on the other. Moral responsibility therefore resides, among other, within the particu-
lar way the researcher has framed the question of research. It goes without saying that 
this deeply interconnects with CTS’s research agenda in its attempt to demand from the 
researcher a more critical self-reflexive attitude. Causation ultimately amounts to a type 
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of questioning that seeks to make a particular point about the case at hand and ‘this is 
largely an issue of politics and ethics’ (2008, 342). Asking causal question therefore 
brings both the ethical and the political back in; an endeavour that is central to CTS’s 
agenda of (re)politicisation (Jackson 2009). What this all entails then is that CTS’s com-
mitment to a ‘‘do no harm’ approach to research [and] taking responsibility for the antic-
ipated impact of [this] research’ (Jackson et al. 2009, 226) should no longer be understood 
as mere critique of OTS. By advancing historically and contextually grounded understan-
dings that explain socially-constructed acts of terrorism in causal terms, CTS can poten-
tially provide a substantial account of these acts that outperforms the orthodox conception 
of causation in both its efficacy and critical disposition. 
 
Causation as dialogue 
A final element of CTS’s critical orientation that can be developed as elemental to a cau-
sal analysis of terrorism concerns the notion of dialogue. This not only stems from the 
fundamental role that dialogue plays in the transformation of terrorist violence itself (To-
ros 2012; Jackson and Hall 2016), it also involves bridging the gap between the OTS and 
CTS epistemic communities (Horgan and Boyle 2008; Ranstorp 2009; Jackson 2012). 
Yet the necessity of dialogue also stems from the intrinsically contested character of cau-
sal interpretation that undermines the possibility of reified, “root” causes. Causal expla-
nation operates under the assumptions that there can be no ‘super-criterion, acceptable to 
all’ (Suganami 2008, 343), which can transform a particular causal interpretation into an 
objective regularity that allows for future prediction. In other words, the problem of multi-
interpretability is intrinsic to causal analysis. Yet, as it was argued above, this should not 
imply a relapse into causal relativism but rather an open dialogue in which different cau-
sal explanations are assessed; something that directly resonates within CTS’s commit-
ment to interdisciplinarity and epistemological pluralism. More so, Suganami has argued 
  25 
that causal explanation should involve this intrinsic openness to conflicting interpreta-
tions: 
 
IR theorists should keep their minds open to a wide range of evidence and possible causal 
scenarios; they should construct an explanatory narrative and appreciate that any expla-
nation of a historical social process involves a balance of judgement; and any claim to 
have arrived at a balanced account will remain contested by other interpretations (Suga-
nami 2016, 15). 
 
Although it is not in the interest of this article to codify how dialogue between causal 
explanations or interpretations of terrorism can be operationalised, this does not discard 
the necessity of substantiating what a dialogical conception of causation could potentially 
look like. As mentioned above, dialogue is elemental to practically addressing and trans-
forming terrorism as well as bridging the gap between the different epistemic communi-
ties that are engaged in the study of terrorism. More so, CTS as a research agenda is 
explicitly predicated on the goal ‘to generate real dialogue and debate, open up new ques-
tions and areas of research, and re-energise, revitalise, and improve the contemporary 
study of political terrorism’ (Jackson et al. 2009, 4). Accordingly, this has fostered a 
number of relevant articles in the field (Gad 2012; Mac Ginty 2013; Toros 2016). It there-
fore does not require much elaboration on why dialogical inquiry is important if not es-
sential to the study of terrorism. Yet the fact remains that this systematic focus on dia-
logue between causal explanations has not been picked up in CTS’s lines of inquiry. In-
corporating such a dialogical conception of causation would not only embolden CTS to 
further expose OTS’s flawed and problematic understanding of causation but also ad-
vance a more inclusive engagement that takes seriously the contextual and historical fa-
bric of the particular case in question without neglecting the agential role. In addition, 
this would also provide CTS with a full-fledged alternative understanding of causation 
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that provides a platform for the interpretation of and dialogue about the causes of terro-
rism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has revealed how a problematic conception of causation is haunting both or-
thodox and critical studies of terrorism. The central concern consisted of highlighting 
how the latter, despite its commitment to epistemological pluralism, has predominantly 
refused to engage causal analysis on grounds that are increasingly hard to justify. Indeed, 
CTS unknowingly reproduces a conventional understanding of causation and thereby ex-
cludes the possibility of advancing an alternative conceptualisation of the concept. There 
is a rather simple explanation for this paradox that is to do with the way post-positivist 
theories more broadly have been affected by an anti-causal agenda. As such, it is not an 
internal problem to CTS but one related to a lack of critical yet sustained engagement 
with causation in other social scientific disciplines such as IR (Kurki 2008). It thereby 
concerns a persistent conflation of the concept of causation with the advancement of a 
positivist philosophy of science. More so, even though Hume’s understanding of causa-
tion as grounded in regular observation of constant conjunction does in no discernible 
way necessitate such an advancement, post-positivist theories have grounded their rejec-
tion on the implicit acceptance of this understanding as the only game in town.  
If CTS is serious about its commitment to deepening and broadening our unders-
tanding of terrorist violence, an engagement with causation is unavoidable. Understan-
ding and explaining terrorism by engaging in causal analysis does not require compromi-
sing one’s critical orientation. On the contrary, it has been a repeated contention of this 
article that incorporating causal analysis within the CTS research agenda offers a more 
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effective and forceful way of criticising the implicit reproduction of the conventional un-
derstanding of causation in OTS. Indeed, the latter’s problematic understanding of cau-
sation tends to confirm some of CTS’s primal concerns that have to do with a tendency 
towards dehistorisation and decontextualisation. Especially in its critique of state-cen-
trism, CTS has made the unfortunate error of taking indiscriminate aim at ‘discourses 
concerning the causes of terrorism’ (Heath-Kelly 2010, 236). More importantly then, as 
long as this pattern is reproduced and no viable alternative is offered, OTS will remain 
emboldened in its quest for “root” causes in the service of counter-terrorism policies that 
decontextualise and dehistoricise structural and contextual conditions. 
The essential contribution of this article has therefore consisted of conceptuali-
sing a different way of understanding causation that draws on a CR philosophy of science 
yet also moves beyond it to advance a hermeneutical alternative that resonates well within 
CTS’s research agenda. Although CR has made a number of important interventions in 
CTS’s meta-theoretical debates, its unfortunate reproduction of the subject/object divide 
is incompatible with an understanding of terrorism that is predicated on a discursive and 
reflective orientation (which emphasises the diversity of epistemological perspectives). 
The argument provided here therefore recollects the interpretative, normative, and dialo-
gical fabric of causation. Accordingly, causal explanation takes on the form of establis-
hing historical narratives through an interpretation of the open-systemic, social world that 
allows us to make moral judgements and engage in a more profound dialogue about both 
the particular context in which debates on terrorism occur on the one hand and between 
different, historically- and contextually-grounded interpretations of the causes of terro-
rism on the other. This seamlessly resonates in CTS’s commitment to the integration of 
terrorism studies in a broader context of social theory as well as issues related to empha-
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sising the responsibility this research has to its subject matter. More so, it allows for cau-
sal explanation to bring the historical and contextual back into the core of the research 
framework. 
In the end, the argument inevitably points towards the necessity of advancing a 
causal analysis that operates from within the CTS research agenda. Although providing 
such an analysis exhausts the scope of this inquiry, it is nonetheless worthwhile to explore 
some of the possible directions this could take. The critical space that is opened by causal 
analysis would first of all bring an end to the uncontested reproduction of the conventio-
nal understanding of causation in OTS. Not only would this expose the problematic of 
subjugating causal analysis to informing state-led policies of counter-terrorism; it would 
also challenge the hegemonic position that both this understanding of causation in parti-
cular as well as OTS more generally have acquired. Of greater importance however, 
would be the more grounded and sustained understanding of terrorist violence that the 
alternative conceptualisation of causation would foster. Indeed, it would provide the im-
portant work that CTS has amassed over the last ten years with the strength and efficacy 
of causal analysis.  
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1. This arguably involved a reinterpretation of the psychological element since it no 
longer concerned the psychology of the perpetrator but of the psychology of those 
whom it is perpetrated upon. 
 
2. Porpora also considers interpretivism to be part of post-modern relativism. As this 
tends to contradict the interpretive and historical conceptualisation of causation that 
stems from his broader argument, it is not entirely sure what interpretivism exactly 
stand for in this context. 
 
3. There is of course a tendency to approach OTS as a reified category that no longer 
corresponds to the heterogenous body of scholarship that it is. Horgan and Boyle for 
instance argue that such a conception is ‘not representative of the existing breadth of 
research activity’ (2008: 51) in the field. The present analysis therefore engages the 
way that causation has been conceptualised (or not) in this body of scholarship rather 
than indicating that it represents a homogenous and codified body of scholarship. 
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